Key exchange protocols are essential for building a secure communication channel over an insecure open network. In particular, password-based key exchange protocols are designed to work when user authentication is done via the use of passwords. But, passwords are easy for human beings to remember, but are low entropy and thus are subject to dictionary attacks. Recently, Zhao and Gu proposed a new server-aided protocol for password-based key exchange. Zhao and Gu's protocol was claimed to be provably secure in a formal adversarial model which captures the notion of leakage of ephemeral secret keys. In this paper, we mount a replay attack on Zhao and Gu's protocol and thereby show that unlike the claim of provable security, the protocol is not secure against leakage of ephemeral secret keys. Our result implies that Zhao and Gu's proof of security for the protocol is invalid.
I. Introduction
Key exchange protocols are designed to allow two or more parties to establish a common secret key over a public network. This secret key, commonly called a session key, is then typically used to build confidential or integrity-protected communication channel between the parties. The highest priority in designing a key exchange protocol is placed on ensuring the security of session keys to be established by the protocol. Roughly speaking, establishing a session key securely means that the key is being known only to the intended parties at the end of the protocol run. But unfortunately, the experience has shown that the design of secure key exchange protocols is notoriously difficult. Thus, key exchange protocols must be subjected to a thorough and systematic scrutiny before they are deployed into a public network, which might be controlled by an adversary.
Secure session-key generation requires an authentication mechanism to be integrated into key exchange protocols. In turn, achieving any form of authentication inevitably requires some secret information to be established between users in advance of the authentication stage. Cryptographic keys, either secret keys for symmetric cryptography or private/public keys for asymmetric cryptography, may be one form of the underlying secret information pre-established between users. However, these high-entropy cryptographic keys are random in appearance and thus are difficult for humans to remember, entailing a significant amount of administrative work and costs. Eventually, it is this drawback that password-based authentication has come to be widely used in reality. Passwords are drawn from a relatively small space like a dictionary, and are easier for humans to remember than cryptographic keys with high entropy.
Bellovin and Merritt [1] was the first to consider how two parties, who only share a weak, low-entropy password, and who are communicating over a public network, authenticate each other and agree on a high-entropy cryptographic key to be used for protecting their subsequent communication.
Their protocol, known as encrypted key exchange, or EKE, was a great success in showing how one can exchange password authenticated information while protecting poorly-chosen passwords from the notorious password guessing attacks. Due in large part to the practical significance of password-based authentication, this initial work has been followed by a number of two-party protocols (e.g., [2] 
[6] [7] ) offering various levels of security and complexity.
While two-party protocols for password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) are well suited for client-server architectures, they are inconvenient and costly for use in large scale peer-to-peer systems. Since two-party PAKE protocols require each pair of potential communication parties to share a password, a large number of parties result in an even larger number of passwords to be shared. It is due to this problem that three-party models have been often used in In a typical three-party setting, each party (often called client) does not need to remember and manage multiple passwords, but shares only a single password with a trusted server who then assists clients in establishing a session key by providing authentication services to them. However, this convenience comes at the price of clients' trust in the server. Despite this drawback, the three-party model offers an effective, realistic solution to the problem of session key exchange in large peer-to-peer systems, and in fact is assumed by the popular Kerberos authentication system [13] .
Recently, Zhao and Gu [14] proposed a three-party PAKE protocol making use of the trapdoor test technique introduced by Cash, Kiltz, and Shoup [15] . Zhao and Gu's protocol was claimed to be provably secure under the assumption that the hash functions used in the protocol are random 
II. Review of Zhao and Gu's Protocol
This section describes the three-party PAKE protocol proposed by Zhao and Gu [14] . The protocol participants consist of a single server  and two clients  and . 
Participants
Each participant  in a three-party key exchange is either a client  or the trusted server  . Each  may run the protocol multiple times Passwords are drawn from a dictionary  .
Adversary
The 
The adversary asks SendClient(  ′  , ′)
query. Then the adversary either makes queries:
The adversary asks SendClient(   ,  ) query. Then the adversary either makes queries:
In this definition of freshness, all the queries for
The security of a protocol  against an adversary  is defined in terms of the probability that  succeeds in distinguishing a real session key established in an execution of  from a random session key. That is, the adversary  is considered successful in attacking  if it breaks the semantic security of session keys generated by . More precisely, the security is defined in the following context. The adversary  executes the protocol exploiting as much parallelism as possible and asking any queries allowed in the adversarial model.
During executions of the protocol, the adversary , at any time, asks a Test query to a fresh instance, gets back a key as the response to this query, and at some later point in time, outputs a bit ′ as a guess for the value of the hidden bit  used by the Test oracle. Then the advantage of  in attacking protocol
   or a random key Let     denote the maximum value of     over all  with time complexity at most  and asking at most  queries. Then, protocol  is said to be AKE-secure if     is only negligibly larger than   , where  is a constant and   is the number of SendClient/ SendServer queries. This notion of security is commonly termed as "AKE security".
IV. Breaking AKE Security
In this section, we break the AKE security of Generally speaking, it is desirable that ephemeral secrets exposed in a session should not jeopardize the session-key secrecy of any other sessions. For this reason, key exchange protocols proven AKE-secure in a model that allows strong corruption ought to be resistant against any attacks similar to ours. Our attack shows that the proof of security for
Zhao and Gu's protocol is invalid. The problem with the proof is that the result of EphemeralKeyReveal queries was not adequately considered in the simulation.
V. Conclusion
This work has considered the security of Zhao and
Gu's three-party protocol [14] 
